Does Community Driven Development Work? Evidence from Senegal by Jean-Louis Arcand & Léandre Bassole
Does Community Driven Development Work?
Evidence from Senegal∗
Jean-Louis Arcand†
CERDI-CNRS, Université d’Auvergne and EUDN
Léandre Bassole
CERDI-CNRS, Université d’Auvergne
This draft: 27 March 2006
Abstract
Community Driven Development (CDD) programs are an extremely important component of the
World Bank’s portfolio in the developing world, representing close to $7 billion in 2003, yet solid empirical
evidence on their impact is relatively scarce, especially for Subsaharan Africa. In this paper, we consider
the impact on access to basic services, household expenditures and child anthropometrics of the PNIR
(Programme National d’Infrastructures Rurales) CDD project in Senegal using a unique multidimensional
panel dataset on rural households that we followed over a two-year period. Using a variety of estimation
procedures, including instrumental variables, and working at diﬀerent levels of aggregation, we ﬁnd no
evidence for an impact of the PNIR on household expenditures, but ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of
the program on access by villagers to clean water and health services, as well as on two standard measures
of child malnutrition. The latter eﬀects are particularly important, quantitatively, for children in poor
households. The identiﬁcation strategy we adopt in order to assess the impact of completed projects on
beneﬁciary welfare highlights the importance of the role played by village chiefs and sub-regional politics
in determining which eligible villages receive projects and which villages do not.
Keywords: Impact evaluation, Community Driven Development, Multidimensional panel data models.
JEL Classiﬁcation numbers: O19, H43, I12, I38.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Community Driven Development (CDD) is very big business. In 2003 alone, it represented $7 billion in
World Bank commitments (Mansuri and Rao (2004)). Given the absolute magnitude of CDD programs, as
well as their very important share of development assistance at the global level, and given that it is unlikely
that their importance will decline in the near future, it is of considerable interest to know whether, and how,
they work.
There is a growing controversy surrounding CDD, spurred by the presumption that they are not as
"bottom up" as they are meant to be. Indeed, critics of CDD, as well as of similar "participative" approaches,
argue that they are not community-driven or -based at all, and that they essentially furnish a thinly-disguised
veil behind which local elites or opportunistic development entrepreneurs hijack resources that never reach
their intended recipients (Platteau and Gaspart (2003)). This "elite capture" view of CDD operations has
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1also been coupled with the critique that no existing evaluations of CDD programs allow one to identify any
signiﬁcant gain to their participative element, with respect to "standard", top-down alternatives (Mansuri
and Rao (2004)).1
In light of these controversies, the purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment, based on a unique
panel dataset, of the impact of a major CDD program in Senegal. The empirical approach of the paper
is three-pronged. First, we study the impact of treatment by the program on the accessibility of basic
services, household expenditures and child anthropometrics, using a quasi-experimental approach in which
geographical units treated by the program were matched, based on the explicit criteria used by the program
initiators to establish deployment, with equivalent geographical units that were not treated. This provides
us a with an estimate of the impact of the "intent to treat".
Second, we provide instrumental variables estimates of the impact of completed projects on the household
and child response variables, using an identiﬁcation strategy based on the workings of elite capture at the
village level and its interraction with the eﬀorts deployed by a given village to obtain a completed project, as
measured by the opinions expressed by village chiefs. This allows us to assess the magnitude of the impact
of "treatment on the treated".
Finally, we use instrumental variables methods to estimate the impact of completed projects within
geographical units that eventually get treated by the program (who therefore act as their own controls),
where our identiﬁcation strategy is augmented to include instrumental variables based on various measures
of the political power at the sub-regional level of individual villages.
Our empirical results, whether they are based on quasi-experimental methods or on instrumental variables
estimates, suggest that the PNIR-CDD program (i) signiﬁcantly improved village access to clean water and
health facilities, (ii) signiﬁcantly reduced the prevalence of underweight and stunted children, with this eﬀect
being particularly pronounced for children residing in poor households, while it (iii) did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect
household expenditures per capita. Moreover, our identiﬁcation strategy, as revealed by the reduced forms
explaining the likelihood of a village taking delivery of a completed project, highlights the importance of the
role played by village chiefs and by local democratic politics at the sub-regional level.
2T h e c o n t e x t
A countrywide consultative process was undertaken in Senegal in 1996 and revealed that the priority needs
of the rural population were primarily improved access roads, drinking water, access to health and education
services, and improved economic opportunities in rural areas. The population also expressed a strong desire
to participate in the key decisions aﬀecting local development, and to assume an increased share in the
funding of local development plans.2
Within the context of its overall development strategy, the Senegalese government drafted, with the
participation of civil society, a Letter of Decentralized Rural Development Policy (LPDRD). The LPDRD set
out a long-term strategy designed to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth in the rural sector,
as a means for eﬀective rural poverty reduction. The key objectives of the strategy were to ensure eﬀective
implementation of the decentralization policy; promote partnerships between the various actors involved
in the participatory local development planning process to facilitate the broadening of the decision-making
platform; ensure an increased and predictable ﬂow of resources for investments in community-based social
1Wassenich and Whiteside (2003) and Rawlings, Sherburne-Benz, and Van Domelen (2004) provide assessments of current
Bank practices in terms of impact evaluation of CDD programs.








































1and economic infrastructure; and strengthen the capacity of rural communities to assume full responsibility
for local development planning and implementation.3
The World Bank- and IFAD-initiated Programme national d’infrastructures rurales ("National Rural
Infrastructures Program", henceforth, PNIR) constitutes one of the keystones of this strategy, and operates
at the level of the smallest sub-regional administrative unit in Senegal –the Communauté rurale ("rural
community", henceforth, CR). An average CR includes 42 villages (the number varies between 3 and 132
villages over the 320 CRs in Senegal), and has a population of 13,391 souls (std. = 12,799). 90 CRs were
chosen from among the poorest in the nine rural regions of Senegal for treatment by the PNIR. 78% of the
poor in Senegal live in rural areas, where the average incidence of poverty is about 40%, as compared with
16% in urban areas. The rural population to beneﬁt from the project is estimated at nearly two million
people, more than half of whom are currently poor.
One of the major goals of the PNIR is to operationalize decentralized rural development processes,
including matched grant funding aimed at providing target rural communities with basic social and economic
infrastructure. In theory, the project is designed to support the decentralization and ﬁscal reform processes;
strengthen the capacity of CRs and local governments to plan, prioritize, manage, and maintain community-
based infrastructure; and provide funding for demand-driven community-based rural infrastructure that is
managed in a sustainable way. It is hoped that the resulting community infrastructure, combined with
improvements in the access of communities to the national road network, will revitalize the local economy
and provide enhanced opportunities for income and employment generation.
The project’s participatory processes for identiﬁcation of needs, priority setting, decision-making and
management are, in theory, designed to ensure that the infrastructures to be funded correspond to the
highest priorities of each rural community; and that they will beneﬁt the majority of its population. A
central tenet in project design is ensuring the proper representation of the vulnerable and/or marginalized
groups (the young, women, and speciﬁc castes) in the identiﬁcation, design and implementation of community
development plans. The formal inclusion of these groups in the local community development committee
(Commité de concertation et de gestion –CCG), and in the microproject implementation and maintenance
committees, is supposed to enhance responsiveness to the needs of these groups, and to ensure that the local
elites do not monopolize project beneﬁts. The eﬀective participation of these groups is, again in theory, part
of the eligibility criteria for funding. The menu of eligible infrastructures includes health, educational and
sanitary facilities, potable water and access roads. The long-term vision of the PNIR is one of CRs planning
and managing their own development programmes, and mobilizing the necessary ﬁnancial resources.
The timing of treatment by the PNIR was determined in 2002, before our involvement in the project,
and the planned deployment of the program, despite sometimes intense political pressure from local oﬃcials,
underwent almost no changes. Treatment was explicitly determined on the basis of ﬁve indices at the CR
level, attributing a score from 0 to 100 based on the proportion of the population with access to water, a
health center, a school, a road, and a market. Based on these indices, 90 CRs were chosen for treatment
out of a total of 320.
In order to construct our main counterfactual in a quasi-experimental manner, we therefore selected our
control group CRs by running a simple probit where the dependent variable took on the value 1 when the
C Rh a db e e nc h o s e nt ob et r e a t e db yt h eP N I R ,a n dz e r oo therwise. The explanatory variables, in addition
3There are a large number of poverty alleviation programmes in rural Senegal. Most are based on decentralized and
participatory approaches, in which community investments are demand-driven. In this context, the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) is spearheading eﬀorts to decentralize ﬁscal and ﬁnancial management procedures. Bilateral









































1to regional dummies, were the ﬁve indices utilized by the program initiators. We then selected 18 treated
CRs, which we matched with 18 control CRs based on the predicted probability of treatment. These 36
CRs were chosen amongst those included in the 2001 ESAM2 survey in order to allow us to test the parallel
trends assumption between ESAM2 and our own baseline (more on this below). The timing of treatment is
presented in Table 1, along with the number of completed projects, by type of infrastructure.4
3 Basic results: treatment by the PNIR
At the lowest level of disaggregation, our speciﬁcation is given by the panel regression:
ycivjt = Tjtγ + x0
civjtθ + εcivjt, (1)
where c =1 ,...,C denotes children, i =1 ,...,I denotes households, v =1 ,...,V denotes villages, j =1 ,...,J
denotes CRs and t =0 ,...,T denotes time periods; ycivjt denotes the response variable, Tjt is a dummy
variable that is equal to 1 if CR j is treated by the PNIR in period t and 0 otherwise, xcivjt is a matrix
of covariates that always includes period dummies in order to account for common shocks that aﬀect all
observations in a given period, and εcivjt is a disturbance term that we shall decompose in various manners
depending upon the context. In increasing order of aggregation, our response variables are constituted by
child anthropometrics (for children aged between 0 and 36 months), household expenditures per capita, and
access to various types of basic infrastructure by the village community.
Our basic purpose is to estimate the magnitude of the average treatment eﬀect (ATE), also known as
the "intent to treat", given by the parameter γ, as well as its associated standard error. When the unit of
observation is the household, for example, the speciﬁcation given in (1) will correspond to a panel regression
where the disturbance term will account for household-speciﬁce ﬀects, thereby yielding what is essentially a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) estimator.5
Since treatment by the PNIR is deﬁned at a higher level of aggregation than the response variables, it
is essential to adjust standard errors for clustering (Moulton (1986), Moulton (1990)). Failure to do so will
result in downward-biased standard errors that lead to the possibility of spuriously identifying a statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect of treatment. As such, all of the standard errors presented below, since observations are
at a level of aggregation lower than that of a CR, are clustered at the CR level.6
Table 2 compares the distributions of the 4 response variables (household expenditures per capita and
three standard anthropometric indicators for children) in our baseline survey (t =0 )a n dc o n ﬁrms that there
is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between households or children living in CRs that are eventually
treated (over the following 2 years) and those that will not be. This is true whether we consider means,
or whether we consider the entire distribution of the response variables using the Bartlett or Kolmogorov-
4The 18/18 split between treated and non-treated CRs corresponds to t =1–our second survey (t =0corresponds to
our baseline). Of the 18 CRs initially in the control group, 3 received treatment at t =2 . Treatment at the CR level
corresponds to a bundle of services, and the potential economies of scale in service delivery that can be obtained through
multisectoral interventions have been stressed by Fay, Leipziger, Wodon, and Yepes (2005) on the basis of a cross-country
regression framework that exploits within-country variation between asset quintiles (they highlight the positive interaction
eﬀect associated with a multiplicative health×infrastructure variable). See also Chong and Hentschel (2003) on bundling of
services in Peru, and Jalan and Ravallion (2003) on the interaction between infrastructure and health knowledge in reducing
child diarrhea in India.
5A similar approach is adopted by Alderman, Hoogeveen, and Rossi (2006), who consider the eﬀect of the Partage program
on child malnutrition using the four rounds of the Kagera (Tanzania) LSMS survey.









































1Smirnoﬀ test statistics. This is a ﬁrst indication that the quasi-experimental approach used to select our
counterfactual CRs will not bias our results either in favor or against identifying eﬀects of treatment by the
PNIR.
Descriptive statistics on the full sample over the ﬁve rounds of our surveys (t =0to t =4 ) are provided in
Table 3. The households in the villages considered here are particularly poor, even by Senegalese standards:
mean expenditures per capita (which include an estimate of the opportunity value of home-produced and
consumed agricultural output), over a 4 month period, are equal to FCFA 13,614, which is roughly equivalent
to $US 0.23 per household member per day. Even expressed in adult-equivalent terms, the corresponding
ﬁgure is $US 0.28. Households are large –almost 11 members on average– and a surprizingly high number
of heads, given their mean age (53) are literate (35.9%). The villages in the sample are relatively large
(1,113 inhabitants), and are overwhelmingly not connected to the national electricity grid (74.8%).
The anthropometric results for children reveal better average performance for girls than for boys, a fact
that has often been noted in Subsaharan Africa over the past 40 years, as noted by Svedberg (1990). There
is signiﬁcant heterogeneity when one breaks down the averages by age category, with a tendency for the mean
z−scores to be better for very small children (0 to 12 months). Note also that intra-household heterogeneity
in child anthropometrics is important, as is intra-child heterogeneity, a fact that will be important, in terms
of identiﬁcation, given our use in what follows of within-household and within-child estimation procedures.
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 provide kernel density estimates that represent the unconditional distributions over
the ﬁve sample periods of log expenditures per capita and three diﬀerent anthropometric measures of child
health, for households living in PNIR-treated and control-group CRs. With respect to households residing
in control-group CRs, the unconditional distribution of log expenditures per capita appears to be shifted
slightly to the right for treated households (especially towards the middle of the distribution), and a much
more noticeable shift to the right is apparent in the distribution of the weight-for-age z−scores (WAZ) for
children who reside in treated CRs. The same would appear to be true for the distribution of weight-
for-height (WHZ), with the shift in the distribution of the height-for-age z−scores (HAZ) being much less
noticeable.
These graphic results are considered more explicitly on a period-by-period basis in Table 4, which provides
simple tests of the diﬀerence in the unconditional means of the response variables, between treated and
control group CRs. In unconditional terms, expenditures per capita are signiﬁcantly greater in PNIR-
treated households than in control-CR households at t =3and t =4 . For height-for-age and weight-for-age,
children in PNIR-treated CRs have signiﬁcantly better anthropometric outcomes at t =4(for WAZ, this is
also true at t =3 ), whereas there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in terms of weight-for-height. Of
course these results are purely suggestive of the impact of the PNIR on household expenditures and child
malnutrition, in that they do not control for any source of time varying or time-invariant heterogeneity.
3.1 Household expenditures
In analyzing the impact of the PNIR on the logarithm of household expenditures per capita, our basic
speciﬁcation is given by:
yijt = Tjtγ + x0
ijtθ + εijt, (2)








































1where λi denotes household-speciﬁce ﬀects. Our broadest sample is an unbalanced panel consisting of
756 households, distributed in 71 villages in 36 C R s ,a n do b s e r v e da tl e a s to v e r2 periods, yielding 3,446
observations. Of these, 1,948 are eligible at one time or another for treatment by the PNIR program.
Note that the within-household estimator also sweeps out any village- or CR-speciﬁce ﬀects. Results are
presented in the upper portion of the ﬁrst column of Table 5. The estimated average treatment eﬀect (ATE)
corresponds to an increase of 5.5% in household expenditures per capita, but with a standard error that
renders this eﬀect statistically indistinguishable from zero (s.e. =0 .08).
In order to see whether the insigniﬁcant average eﬀect hides any heterogeneity, we then consider the
subsample of households which are observed in our baseline survey (t =0 ), and divide households into
three expenditure classes, corresponding to the poor (the ﬁrst quintile), the "middle class" (corresponding
to quintiles 2, 3 and 4), and the rich (the top quintile), based upon their expenditures per capita at t =0 .
This yields a balanced subsample of 562 households (2,810 observations, of which 1,573 are treated) which
we follow over all 5 periods. We then estimate our basic household expenditures speciﬁcation separately
on each of these three classes of households, whose identities are therefore constant over time.7 Results are
presented in the lower part of Table 5 (column 1), and conﬁrm the absence of statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects
on expenditures per capita.8
None of these results change appreciably when we replace expenditures per capita with total household
expenditures, or with expenditures per adult equivalent. Similarly, results are the same when variables are
expressed in levels instead of in logarithms.9
3.2 Child anthropometrics
We consider three measures of child health: the z-scores for weight-for-age (WAZ), height-for-age (HAZ),
and weight-for-height (WHZ). Each observation corresponds to a child, aged between 0 and 36 months,
followed over at least two periods, yielding the panel speciﬁcation:
ycijt = Tjtγ + x0
cijtθ + εcijt, (4)
εcijt = λi + ηcijt, (5)
where λi denotes household-speciﬁce ﬀects. The within-household estimator will control for village- and
CR-level eﬀects, but will leave child-speciﬁc, time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity unaccounted for. An
7Note that it is essential that the identities of the households be constant over time, and that the expenditure classes be
deﬁned exogenously in terms of the initial period. A multiplicative dummy speciﬁcation in which the PNIR treatment dummy
would be multiplied by an expenditure class dummy is inconsistent, since households can move between expenditure classes
from one period to the next, and the right-hand-side treatment variables would then be correlated with the response variable by
construction. An approach that we are currently investigating makes use of the panel quantile regression estimator developed
by Koenker (2004), to whom we are grateful for providing us with his code.
8The estimated ATE on this subsample is equal to a 3.6% increase in household expenditures per capita, which is statistically
indistinguishable from zero (s.e. =0 .09).
9An additional check of the absence of an eﬀect of treatment by the PNIR on expenditures per capita, can be had by
exploiting between-household and between-village variation and estimating a three-dimensional variance components model,
where one replaces (3) with a nested speciﬁcation: εivt = νv +λiv +ηivt,w h e r eνv ∼ i.i.d (0,σ2
v) denotes the vth unobservable
village-speciﬁce ﬀect and λiv ∼ i.i.d (0,σ2
λ) denotes the nested eﬀect of the ith household within the vth village; the remainder
disturbance, ηivt,i sa s s u m e dt ob ei.i.d (0,σ2
η). Results are very similar when one replaces this with a household-RC nested
speciﬁcation that takes the form εijt = νj +λij +ηijt. In order to estimate the variance components, we implemented both a
Wallace and Hussain (1969) and a Wansbeek and Kapteyn (1989) estimator (see Baltagi, Song, and Jung (2001) for a discussion
of their relative merits, as well as more sophisticated alternatives). Again, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant impact of the
PNIR on log expenditures per capita, on average, and when we estimate separately over our three initial expenditure classes,
and the appropriate Hausman tests do not reject any of the speciﬁcations. Moreover, the σ2
v and σ2
λ are found to be relatively
small with respect to σ2
η indicating that it is time-varying household-village eﬀects that are driving our results. These results








































1alternative speciﬁcation which controls for unobserved child-speciﬁc heterogeneity replaces (5) with:
εcijt = λc + ηcijt, (6)
where λc denotes a child-speciﬁce ﬀect.10 There are 993 children in our sample, who belong to 496 households
(these constitute a subset of the 756 households considered earlier). Given that a number of children are
observed for more than 2 periods, our sample consists of 2,057 observations, of which 1,109 are treated by
the PNIR.
WAZ is a measure of short-term malnutrition and may vary in the short-run as a result of transitory
income and health shocks; it is also referred to as underweight. HAZ, also referred to as stunting,i s
a measure of long-term malnutrition, and will reﬂect the cumulative impact of disease spells and income
shocks over time. WHZ, also known as wasting, is a measure of short-term malnutrition that combines the
weight and height metrics. Our purpose in assessing the impact of the PNIR program on these variables
is certainly not to argue that CDD programs are the best or even a good manner of addressing the issue
of child malnutrition. Rather, our purpose is to examine the impact of a CDD program on alternative
measures of household welfare that may, in addition, reﬂect changes in the intra-household allocation of
resources induced by treatment.
Results are presented in columns 2 to 7 of Table 5. In columns 2 and 3, we consider the eﬀect of the PNIR
on WAZ. Whether we include household- or child-speciﬁce ﬀects changes the results little, in that both ATEs
are statistically indistinguishable from zero. For HAZ, on the other hand, the ATE is of 0.304 standard
deviations of the z−scores using household-speciﬁce ﬀects, and 0.406 standard deviations with child-speciﬁc
eﬀects. The result which controls for child-speciﬁce ﬀects is statistically signiﬁcant at the usual levels of
conﬁdence, with an associated standard error of 0.15. Note also that most of this eﬀect appears to stem
from the impact of the PNIR on girls (the female-speciﬁcc o e ﬃcient is equal to 0.484, s.e. =0 .21 –the
male-speciﬁcc o e ﬃcient is statistically indistinguishable from zero at the usual levels of conﬁdence), and older
children (the coeﬃcient associated with the 24 to 36 month age category is equal to 0.519, s.e. =0 .15).11
Taken in conjunction with the absence of signiﬁcant eﬀects of treatment on expenditures per capita, these
results indicate that improvements in the welfare of some household members do obtain as a consequence of
treatment by the PNIR, but that they do not appear to be caused by an increase in household expenditures
per capita.12
As shown by the results presented in the lower portion of Table 5, in which we restrict our attention to the
balanced subsample of children belonging to households which we observe in our baseline survey and which
we follow over the following two years, the average eﬀect obscurs signiﬁcant diﬀerences across expenditure
classes, just as was the case for the sex and the age of the child.13 For the WAZ indicator with child-speciﬁc
eﬀects, the ATE for poor families is 4 times greater than the average eﬀect (the associated coeﬃcient is equal
10See Behrman and Hoddinott (2005) for an example of the use of child-speciﬁce ﬀects in identifying the impact of program
treatment (the Mexican PROGRESA, in their case) on child malnutrition.
11Though somewhat surprizing at ﬁrst sight, note that the average WAZ scores are the worst f o rc h i l d r e ni nt h e2 4t o3 6
months age class (see Table 3), and that the HAZ scores are the second worst among the three age categories, for older children.
If there are diminishing marginal returns to treatment as nutritional status improves, the WAZ result is less surprizing than
one might think.
12There are no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of the PNIR on WHZ. Note that the WAZ, HAZ and WHZ equations may be
correlated, see Morales, Aguilar, and Calzadilla (2004), and that it may be possible to improve on the eﬃciency of estimation
by taking this into account.
13This subsample is constituted by 798 c h i l d r e n ,w h ob e l o n gt o383 households (these constitute a subset of the 562 households
considered earlier in the balanced household subsample). In terms of quantile regression methods alluded to earlier, the only








































1to 0.964, s.e. =0 .36). In contrast, the WAZ of children in middle class and rich households are unaﬀected
b yt h eP N I R . T h es a m ec a nb es a i df o rH A Z ,w h e r et h ei m p a c to nc h i l d r e nf r o mp o o rh o u s e h o l d si st w i c e
the average eﬀect (when we control child-speciﬁce ﬀects), whereas children in the upper four quintiles of
the baseline expenditure per capita distribution are unaﬀected. These results suggest, despite the absence
of targetting in the PNIR, that it is the children of poor families who appear to beneﬁtt h em o s tf r o mt h e
program, by dint of the simple fact that the marginal beneﬁts to a given improvement in village infrastructure
will be greater for the poor than for the rich or the middle class.
3.3 Access to basic services
Our village level surveys collected information concerning the access of villagers to four basic services:
drinking water, health services, a primary school, and a paved road. Our response variable yk
vjt takes on
the value 1 when basic infrastructure k is available to villagers within the village, and zero otherwise.
In order to identify the impact on the accessibility of basic services attributable to treatment by the
PNIR, we consider the following village-level linear probability model:14
yk
vjt = Tjtγ + x0
vjtθk + εvjt, (7)
εvjt = λv + ηvjt, (8)
where λv is a village-speciﬁce ﬀect. Results are presented in Table 6. Treatment by the PNIR increases
the probability that villagers will have access to drinking water within the village by 22.3% (s.e. =0 .06),
whereas the corrresponding increase for access to basic health services (constituted by a "case de santé") is
24% (s.e. =0 .09). If we assess village access to health services on the basis of a "poste de santé", a much
larger structure than the "case de santé" which is meant to serve several villages, and code the variable
t oe q u a l1i ft h e" p o s t ed es a n t é "i se i t h e rw i t h i nt he village or within 5km, the corresponding coeﬃcient
indicates an ATE of 15.3% (s.e. =0 .07). For all of the results on access to basic services presented in Table 6,
the point estimates are roughly the same and the standard errors slightly smaller when we restrict ourselves
to a balanced panel consisting of the 60 villages that are observed over each of the ﬁve time periods. Finally,
despite the important road-construction component of the PNIR program, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects in
terms of access to a paved road. This is due to two reasons. First, on a general level, it is likely that the
late implementation of this component of the program (with respect to the timing of our surveys) renders it
diﬃcult to identify any signiﬁcant eﬀect over the 2003-2005 period. Second, no road construction appears
amongst the completed projects in the villages treated by the PNIR in our sample.
3.4 Robustness
While the test statistics presented in Table 2 did not reject the null hypothesis that the distributions of
our household and child-speciﬁc response variables were the same for "eventually" treated and control ob-
servations in our baseline survey (thus supporting the validity of the quasi-experimental construction of
our control CRs), a number of other concerns could signiﬁcantly bias our results. In order to assess the
robustness of our ﬁndings, we therefore consider whether: (i) the "parallel trends" assumption is veriﬁed; (ii)
serial correlation issues signiﬁcantly bias our standard errors (in all likelihood downwards, in the case of the
child anthropometrics results); and (iii) the inclusion of time-varying child- or household-speciﬁcc o v a r i a t e s








































1signiﬁcantly alters our results.
3.4.1 The parallel trends assumption
A key assumption, on which our results are based, is that our counterfactual is properly constructed. In
particular, it is essential not only that the treated group and the control group be indistinguishable in the
baseline survey, but also that they would have evolved over time i nt h es a m em a n n e r ,i nt h ea b s e n c eo ft h e
program. Though one cannot test this hypothesis directly over the entire sample, the availability of data
on the same households prior to our baseline survey allows us to test the "parallel trends" assumption.15
These data are constituted by the ESAM2 survey, carried out 2 years prior to our baseline, and upon which
we based our sampling scheme for this purpose.16
In order to test the parallel trends assumption, we artiﬁcially code the observations in our baseline survey
(t =0 ) that will eventually be treated over the following two years (t =1to t =4 ) as if they were treated
at t =0 .17 Combining our baseline survey (t =0 ) with the ESAM2 data on the same households (t = −1)
yields a balanced panel dataset of 1,400 observations (700 households), of which 474 are "treated" at t =0 .
We then implement a simple DD estimator where the initial period is given by ESAM2 (t = −1)a n dt h eﬁnal
period is given by our baseline (t =0 ).18 Finding a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of this "placebo" treatment
would imply rejection of the parallel trends assumption in that it would indicate a signiﬁcant divergence in
the evolution over time of our response variables between the treated and control households. If, for example,
the "treated" households were systematically improving in terms of their response variables between t = −1
and t =0 , with the control households’ response variables remaining unchanged on average, the positive
impact of treatment that we uncovered for a number of anthropometric response variables between t =0
and t =4could be entirely spurious. A similar spurious ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant eﬀect of treatment by the
PNIR would occur if the control observations’ situation were systematically worsening over time, with the
"treated" observations’ response variables remaining stable. As such, failure to reject the parallel trends
assumption is crucial in terms of the credibility of our empirical ﬁndings concerning the impact of the intent
to treat.
The results of a series of tests of the parallel trends assumption are presented in Table 7. As should be
clear, the parallel trends assumption is not rejected, on average, be it for log expenditures per capita or for
our three measures of child anthropometrics. Moreover, the parallel trends assumption is not rejected for
log expenditures per capita and for child anthropometrics, even when we estimate separately over the three
diﬀerent initial expenditure classes. Similarly, when we disaggregate the impact of the "placebo" PNIR
treatment by sex and by age category for the anthropometric indicators, there is no statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect.
To the extent that the non-rejection of the parallel trends hypothesis supports the assumption that
treated and control CRs would have evolved in a similar manner over the two years of our surveys in the
absence of the PNIR, our estimates of the eﬀects of treatment would appear not to be systematically biased
either upwards or downwards.
15See, e. g., any standard reference such as Wooldridge (2002).
16The ESAM2 (Enquête sénégalaise auprès des ménages) survey is essentially a Senegalese LSMS.
17R e s u l t sa r et h es a m ei fw eo n l yc o n s i d e rt h o s eC R st h a ta r et r e a t e da tt =1 .
18Note that we must restrict our attention to a speciﬁcation that includes household-speciﬁce ﬀects in that there are no
children that we can follow over the 2 year period that separates ESAM2 and our baseline. Our child sample is constituted
by 837 children belonging to 450 households that have children aged between 0 and 36 months over both surveys, of which 232









































As forcefully argued by Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan (2004), (positive) serial correlation can signiﬁ-
cantly bias standard errors downwards (even when intra-CR cluster eﬀects have been accounted for), raising
the possibility that statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects may be erroneously attributed to treatment. In order to
assess whether our results were subject to this problem (particularly those results pertaining to WAZ and
HAZ), we re-estimated our basic speciﬁcation in terms of simple DD estimators restricted to two periods.19
Results are presented in Tables 8 and 9. For log expenditures per capita, little changes with respect
to the results presented in Table 5: irrespective of the ﬁnal period that is chosen, the ATE of the PNIR is
always statistically indistinguishable from zero, and this remains true when we estimate separately over each
of the three initial expenditure classes.20
For the WAZ indicator of child anthropometrics, taking the t =4minus t =0case as an example, the ATE
is statistically indistinguishable from zero, (as in Table 5), while the eﬀect on the WAZ of children in poor
households almost doubles in size with respect to the results presented in Table 5 (to 1.720, s.e. =0 .60)w h e n
we control for child-speciﬁce ﬀects, and remains statistically signiﬁcant at the usual levels of conﬁdence.
For HAZ, on the other hand, the results reveal that the standard error associated with the ATE reported in
Table 5 (which implied a statistically signiﬁcant impact of the PNIR on HAZ, on average, using child-speciﬁc
eﬀects) was underestimated: though the point estimate of the ATE for each DD is similar in magnitude to
the average eﬀect over 5 periods, the reported standard errors yield simple DD estimates of the ATE that
are not statistically signiﬁcant, at the usual levels of conﬁdence. This is not surprizing for the HAZ measure
of child anthropometrics, in that, in contrast to WAZ, it will exhibit a good deal of persistence over time
because of its cumulative reﬂection of spells of malnutrition. On the other hand, and though the standard
errors increase substantially, this phenomenon is not suﬃcient to eliminate the statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect
of the PNIR on the HAZ of children from poor households. Indeed, if we take the t =0to t =4DD with
child-speciﬁce ﬀects as our preferred speciﬁcation, the point estimates increase substantially with respect to
the eﬀects reported in Table 5, reaching 1.528 (s.e. =0 .65).
Thus, while there is some evidence that serial correlation biases the standard errors for the eﬀect of the
PNIR on HAZ presented in Table 5 downwards, the t =0to t =4DD results conﬁrm that while treatment
by the PNIR does not aﬀect expenditures per capita, it does signiﬁcantly improves the nutritional status of
children living in poor households.
3.4.3 Covariates and alternative speciﬁcations
A ﬁnal test of the robustness of our ﬁndings involves studying the eﬀect on our results of the inclusion
of a number of time-varying child, household and village characteristics, as well as considering alternative
speciﬁcations for our anthropometric response variables. Covariates include child age, the age and literacy
status of the household head, the population of the village, whether the village is connected to the electricity
19Note that an alternative approach involves the GLS estimator proposed by Hausman and Kuersteiner (2004), who show
(using Montecarlo simulations) that it is not optimal in terms of eﬃciency to entirely discard the temporal dimension of the
data, though a degree of temporal aggregation may be desirable.
20An alternative approach to dealing with the serial correlation issue that can be applied to the expenditure per capita
data involves rewriting our basic equation in terms of a dynamic panel speciﬁcation that includes a lagged-dependent variable:
yijt = αyijt−1 + Tjtγ + x0
ijtθ + εijt, where the disturbance term continues to be decomposed as in (3). Since the within-
household estimator is no longer appropriate, because yijt−1 will be correlated by construction with the household-speciﬁce ﬀect
if the time dimension is ﬁnite (reasonable asymptotics in the present context let T be ﬁnite and I be large), one must resort to
instrumental variables. Application of the usual diﬀerence-GMM or system-GMM estimators (see e.g. Arellano (2003)) yields
no evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant impact of the PNIR on expenditures per capita, be it either on average, or when we








































1grid, and whether a literacy program exists in the village. While inclusion of these time-varying covariates
changes the point estimates somewhat, it does not aﬀect the basic story in which treatment by the PNIR
has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on household expenditures per capita, while it reduces the prevalence
of underweight and stunted children, with these eﬀects being particularly important in poor households.21
For example, the ATE of the PNIR on the weight-for-age z−score of children living in households that were
poor in our baseline survey is equal to 0.953. (s.e. =0 .40), when we include the full set of covariates, while
the corresponing number for HAZ is 0.816 (s.e. =0 .38).
A ﬁnal check of our results involves transforming the anthropometric response variables into dichotomous
variables that equal 1 when the z−score falls below −1.5 –an indication of a moderate level of malnutrition
for each of the indicators– and zero otherwise, and applying a linear probability model (results are similar
if we use a ﬁxed eﬀects (conditional) logit speciﬁcation). For the WAZ of children in poor households, for
example, the point estimate indicates that treatment by the PNIR reduces the probability that a child will
be severely underweight by 30.0%, with the corresponding ﬁgure for severe stunting being 23.4%.
4 Instrumental variables estimates of the impact of completed
PNIR projects
We now turn to estimating the impact of completed PNIR projects, on household and child welfare, in
contrast to treatment at the CR level, which is essentially akin to eligibility. In the standard Manski
(1996) terminology, this corresponds to "the eﬀect of treatment on the treated", as opposed to "the intent
to treat". The distinction is important for two reasons. First, while eligibility of the inhabitants of
a village for the PNIR occurs at the CR level, the implementation of actual infrastructure projects is
village-speciﬁc. In other words, there are numerous villages within PNIR-treated CRs that have received
no infrastructure projects at all. Second, while being eligible for the PNIR is clearly exogenous in that it
depends solely on the village’s physical location within a treated CR, actually obtaining an infrastructure
project is not exogenously determined, and is likely to be correlated with observable and unobservable village
characteristics. Insofar as we shall be identifying the eﬀect of completed projects using a within-household or
within-child estimator, time-invariant village-speciﬁc unobservables are controlled for. On the other hand,
there may be unobservable village-speciﬁca n dt i m e - varying factors that simultaneously aﬀect the response
variable and the probability that an infrastructure project gets completed in a given village. In this case,
the within-household or within-child estimators used so far will result in inconsistent parameter estimates.
4.1 The full sample
We begin by considering the same sample of household as in part 3, which includes 22 CRs that are treated
by t =4and 16 control CRs. The estimated eﬀect of completed projects is thus the diﬀerence in the
response variables between households or children that live in villages that receive a project, and those that
do not, where the counterfactual includes households and children that reside in control CRs (which are not
eligible for PNIR projects), as well as those that reside in villages that become eligible by t =4but that
do not receive a completed project. As with treatment by the PNIR at the CR level, identiﬁcation is thus
21A number of results are interesting in and of themselves, but do not constitute the focus of the paper. For example, we
uncover the usual U-shaped eﬀect of age on z-scores; see Thomas, Strauss, and Henriques (1992). The full results which include








































1achieved through both cross-sectional and time-series variability (see Table 1 for the timing of completed
projects, by type).
4.1.1 Identiﬁcation strategy
The process by which a PNIR project actually gets identiﬁed and formulated at the village-level, transmitted
to the Conseil rural, and implemented suggests that a number of village characteristics may constitute
admissible instruments. For this to be the case, the variables in question must (i) have no direct eﬀect on
the welfare of the households residing in the village (so as to be orthogonal with respect to the structural
equation’s disturbance term) and (ii) be correlated with the likelihood of the village obtaining a PNIR
project (i.e. the instruments must be suﬃciently "strong"). A ﬁrst obvious instrument with which to
identify the impact of completed projects is eligibility per se (Imbens and Angrist (1994)), as given by the
PNIR treatment dummy that has been considered up until now: using this IV on its own would yield a local
average treatment eﬀect –LATE. The results presented in part 3 can also be thought of as reduced forms
in which one of the instrumental variables used to identify the eﬀect of completed projects is entered directly
into the structural equation.
Apart from eligibility for a completed PNIR project, our identiﬁcation strategy here is based upon the
opinions expressed by the village chief, a key player in terms of the setting of village priorities and of the
urgency with which potential project proposals will be formulated and followed up on. In particular, because
of the participatory process inherent to CDD through which marginalized groups are supposed to gain voice
in village decisionmaking, it is possible that there are divergences between the chief’s opinions and actual
conditions in the village, and that these divergences will be ampliﬁed by the CDD process. The success of
a village in obtaining a project will then depend in part upon the outcome of the interaction between the
village chief and the villagers. As such, the reduced forms which explain the likelihood of a village taking
delivery of a completed project are the result of the interaction between the elite capture process alluded to
in the introduction and the reaction of the villagers within the CDD context, though they do not of course
constitute a formal test of its existence.
We begin by considering the correspondance between village priorities, as perceived by the chief, and
those types of projects that are eligible for PNIR funding. We construct a dummy variable that is equal to
1 when the main priority of the village, as identiﬁed by the chief, is compatible with the menu of projects
that are eligible under PNIR funding. If the village chief identiﬁes a village priority that is compatible with
funding by the PNIR (health, educational and sanitary facilities, potable water and access roads) and is able
to inﬂuence the choice of project that gets transmitted by the village to the Conseil rural, then one would
expect this to increase the likelihood of the village obtaining a project.
Of course, it is possible that the opinions concerning village priorities expressed by the chief correspond
to the actual situation in the village in terms of available infrastructure, though our ﬁeldwork leads us to
favor a "pet project" view of the opinions of village chiefs in Senegal. Consider the three main types of rural
infrastructure focused on by the PNIR which turn up as completed projects in our dataset: water, health
and schooling (we also consider road access, though this does not appear among the completed projects
in our sample). If the priority identiﬁed by the village chief systematically corresponds to the type of
infrastructure lacking in the village, then our instrument would be suspect, as it could be correlated with the
structural equation’s disturbance term. In order to ascertain whether this is the case, Table 11 presents a
linear probability regression, with period dummies and village-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, in which the dependent








































1the explanatory variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one when the villagers do not have access to
water (column 1). We do the same for access to a school and for access to a health center (columns 2 and
3). In all three cases, there is no evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant correlation between the village chief’s
opinion and the absence of the infrastructure in question in the village. While this does not conclusively
establish that the chief’s priority for the village is uncorrelated with the disturbance term in the structural
equation, it suggests that the likelihood of this being the case is low. Moreover, it suggests that a degree of
elite capture could obtain in the villages in our sample in that the chief’s opinion is unrelated on average to
the actual priorities of the villages.
Our second instrumental variable is given by the chief’s expectations concerning the future evolution of
economic conditions in the village, which is likely to aﬀect the eﬀort furnished by villagers in proposing and
following up on funding requests. We construct a dummy variable which is equal to 1 when the village
chief’s expectation is that economic conditions in the village will deteriorate during the next 5 years. A
priori, the urgency attached to formulating a request for a PNIR project should be increasing in the expected
deterioration of economic conditions, if the chief’s perception is the key factor that determines the drive of
villagers in submitting proposals. On the other hand, and again because of the participatory nature of the
PNIR process that is theoretically designed to run counter to traditional power structures, it may be the
case that the village chief’s opinions are systematically discounted in collective decisionmaking, and that
the opposite phenomenon will obtain. Another, independent mechanism through which an expectation of
deteriorating economic conditions could decrease the likelihood of receiving a project is if such an opinion re-
ﬂects the perception that current conditions are particularly good (in relative terms) and can only get worse:
if current conditions are perceived as being particularly good (by the chief and the village’s population as
well), this may decrease the urgency with which projects are formulated and submitted, thereby decreasing
the likelihood of taking delivery of a completed project. Though there is no reason ap r i o r ifor the chief’s
expectations concerning the future to be correlated with unobservables that would aﬀect household expen-
ditures or child health (especially once time-invariant heterogeneity is controled for), it is important, for the
IV in question to furnish some modicum of identiﬁcation, that the chief’s opinion concerning the future be
correlated with the opinions of the villagers (whether this correlation is positive or negative is immaterial
from the statistical standpoint, but interesting from the social standpoint).
Though we cannot directly test the correspondance between the village chief’s expectations concerning
the future and those of the village inhabitants, we can assess the coherence of their views concerning the
past. If we regress a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the chief perceives the past year as having been
negative on the proportion of the village population that believes the same, while allowing for village-speciﬁc
eﬀects and period dummies (see column 6 of Table 11), the estimated coeﬃcient is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant at the usual levels of conﬁdence. This indicates, at least as far as the past is concerned, that the
chief’s opinions concerning economic conditions are in line with those of the villagers.
Our third instrumental variable is based on the chief’s perceptions concerning the likely form that will
be taken by the villagers’ contribution to an eventual PNIR project, since ﬁnancial participation by the
villagers is a requisite for PNIR funding. We construct a dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the village
chief is of the opinion that villagers will be willing to contribute only labor to the implementation of a PNIR
infrastructre project in the village, as opposed to labor and money –money alone occurs very rarely. A
ﬁnancial contribution by the villagers of between 5 and 20% (depending upon the type of infrastructure)
of each project’s costs is a key aspect of the PNIR’s implementation process, and the willingness of the








































1of a completed project. If the chief’s perception of the villagers corresponds to their actual opinions and
subsequent acts, one would expect the "only labor contribution" dummy to decrease the probability of the
village receiving a project. On the other hand, the opposite would be true if the chief’s opinions do not
reﬂect the true preferences of the villagers, or if the CDD process per se leads to a heightened willingness
on the part of villagers to contribute ﬁnancially, of which the village chief is not aware.
For this instrument to be admissible, it must of course be the case that it is not correlated with income
shocks to the village that could aﬀect household expenditures or child health. That this exclusion restriction
is likely to be satisﬁed, at least in terms of the perceptions of the chief, is illustrated in column 5 of Table
11 by the lack of correlation betwen the chief’s perception that the villagers would be willing to contribute
only labor and his perception of whether the village is poor.
Summary statistics for the three village chief IVs, for the full sample, are presented in the left-hand
portion of Table 10.
4.1.2 Results
Let Pvjt be a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 when a PNIR project has been completed in village
v,i nC Rj,a tt i m et, and 0 otherwise. Consider estimating the log expenditure per capita equation given
i n( 2 ) ,w h e r ew er e p l a c eTjt by Pvjt:
yijt = Pvjtδ + x0
ijtθ + εijt, (9)
and where Pvjt is instrumented using the excluded IVs discussed in section 4.1.1. Results for the full sample
are presented in the upper portion of Table 12, while the lower parts of the same Table considers the impact
of completed PNIR projects by initial expenditure class, using the balanced sample.
For all of the child anthropometrics IV results presented in Table 12 we use the full set of potential
IVs, including PNIR eligibility, the chief’s identiﬁcation of PNIR-eligible projects as village priorities, the
chief’s expectations concerning the future evolution of economic conditions in the village, and the chief’s
belief that villagers will only be willing to contribute labor, since in no case does this instrument set lead to
the rejection of the overidentifying restrictions. For the household expenditures per capita results, on the
other hand, we conﬁne ourselves to PNIR eligibility and the chief’s identiﬁcation of PNIR-eligible projects
as village priorities. Adding the two remaining excluded IVs did not change the point estimates appreciably,
but did result in the rejection of the tests of the overidentifying restrictions.
For purposes of comparison, the ﬁrst line of the results of Table 12 presents an estimate of the impact
of completed PNIR projects without instrumenting.22 For log expenditures per capita, the point estimate
is 4 times the magnitude of the corresponding eﬀect of the intent to treat (see column 1 of Table 5), and is
statistically signiﬁcant at the usual levels of conﬁdence. Moving to the IV estimates in the second line of the
Table decreases the point estimate somewhat, but also increases the standard error suﬃciently for the result to
be no longer signiﬁcant at the usual levels of conﬁdence. Considering the balanced sample and disaggregating
by initial expenditure class reveals no statistically signiﬁcant impact on household expenditures of completed
projects. Thus, whether we consider eligibility for treatment (as in part 3) or completed projects, the
evidence suggests that the PNIR has little if any impact on household expenditures per capita.
In columns 3 and 5 of Table 12, we present IV estimates, which control for child-speciﬁce ﬀects, of the
22This is similar to the methodology adopted by Behrman and Hoddinott (2005) to study the impact of treatment by the








































1impact of completed projects on WAZ and HAZ. The estimates of the impact of treatment on the treated
are twice as large as those for the intent to treat presented in Table 5, and they are statistically signiﬁcant
at the usual levels of conﬁdence. The same is true when we move to the balanced sample and consider the
impact of completed PNIR projects on the WAZ and HAZ of children living in households that are poor in
our baseline survey. As with the intent to treat, no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of completed projects can
be detected for wasting (WHZ).
The upshot is that completed PNIR projects signiﬁcantly improve the nutritional status of children, and
that this eﬀect is particularly important for children living in poor households. Moreover, to the extent that
one can compare the magnitude of the eﬀe c to ft h ei n t e n tt ot r e a t( T a b l e5 )a n dt h ee ﬀect of treatment on
the treated (Table 12), with the latter being roughly twice the size of the former, the story that emerges is
that the gains to CDD operations in Senegal do not accrue solely on the basis of completed projects: simply
residing in a PNIR-eligible CR brings statistically signiﬁcant beneﬁts in terms of child health (perhaps
because of spillovers from neighbouring villages that receive completed projects), with completed projects
yielding additional improvements.
Note, as indicated by the Shea (1997) R2 and F−statistics from the "partialled out" reduced forms
presented in Table 13, that there is no indication that a "weak instruments problem" biases our results.23
Moreover, the Hahn and Hausman (2002a) test of instrument validity, based on the bias-adjusted 2SLS or
Nagar (1959) estimator proposed by Donald and Newey (2001), does not reject the joint null of instrument
validity and instrument strength.24 In addition, results based on the Fuller (1977) or LIML estimators are
similar to those presented in Table 12, as are the standard errors if one bases them on the Bekker (1994)
formula.
The reduced forms that underly the results presented in Table 12 are interesting in and of themselves in
terms of what they tell us concerning those factors that determine why certain villages obtain PNIR projects
and others do not. They are also of independent interest in that they describe the outcome of the interaction
between village chiefs and villagers in terms of obtaining a project.
Table 13 presents estimates of the reduced forms that correspond to the IV regressions presented in Table
12.25 Consider the reduced forms that correspond to the child anthropometrics results with child-speciﬁc
eﬀects presented in columns 5 and 6.26 Three aspects of the results are worthy of note. First, when a
village chief identiﬁes a village priority that is eligible for PNIR funding, this has positive impact on the
likelihood of the village taking delivery of a completed PNIR project. This suggests that the support of the
village chief is crucial, in terms of the CDD mechanism, in successfully obtaining projects (at least insofar as
23On the weak instruments problem, see the surveys by Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) and Hahn and Hausman (2003),
and an excellent short primer on the ensuing biases by Hahn and Hausman (2002b). Note that Cruz and Moreira (2005) have
shown that these tests can be extremely poor indicators of instrument weakness, and F−statistics below the usual cutoﬀ value
of 10 do not necessarily indicate that a weak instruments problem is present.
24Asymptotic properties of the test are presented in Hausman, Stock, and Yogo (2005). For conciseness we do not present
these results which are, of course, available upon request.
25Village-, household- and child-level controls are included in the structural equation results presented in Table 12, (and,
of course, in the reduced forms presented in Table 13), where applicable, and are given by the covariates discussed in section
3.4.3. Results, in terms of the point estimates and associated standard errors, are almost invariant to the inclusion or exclusion
of these covariates, be it in the structural equations or in the reduced forms. Note that village population has a positive
and statistically signiﬁcant impact on the probability of taking delivery of a completed PNIR project, indicating that there a
signiﬁcant bias in favor of large villages.
26A slightly puzzling aspect of the reduced forms is that the corresponding coeﬃcients are of the opposite sign in the
household-speciﬁce ﬀects reduced forms that underly the household expenditures per capita IV results. Note however, that in
the reduced forms corresponding to the anthropometric results with household-speciﬁce ﬀects presented in columns 3 and 4, the
chief’s priorities have no statistically signiﬁcant impact on the likelihood of taking delivery of a completed project. Whether









































1child anthropometrics is concerned), and this despite the lack of correlation between actual priorities in the
village and the chief’s perceptions. Second, the village chief expecting economic conditions to deteriorate in
the future signiﬁcantly decreases the probability of the village obtaining a completed PNIR project. Third,
when the village chief is of the opinion that villagers will be willing to contribute only labor to a PNIR
project, the likelihood of receiving a completed PNIR project increases dramatically (by 8.1 to 9.4% on
average). Thus, village chiefs may systematically err in their assessment of the willingness of villagers to
contribute ﬁnancially, or the CDD process may lead to grass roots mobilization that is particularly strong
in villages whose inhabitants, in the opinion of the chief, would not have been willing to contribute money.
We provide a partial test of the mobilization argument in column 7 of Table 11, where we consider
those factors that aﬀect the emergence of a functional Comité de Concertation et de Gestion (CCG) –a
village-level institution one of whose purposes is to identify and formulate project proposals which are then
forwarded to the Conseil rural, and which only exists (if at all) within PNIR-treated CRs. The existence
of a CCG is a sine qua non for obtaining PNIR funding, and is a good indicator of the level of political
mobilization achieved in the village through the CDD process. Moreover, its interactions with traditional
village authorities, such as the chief, are likely to have non-negligible consequences in terms of the likelihood
of a village taking delivery of a PNIR project. As should be clear from the results presented in column
7 of Table 11, the probability of a CCG emerging in a village is uncorrelated with the chief believing that
the villagers will be willing to contribute only labor. Similarly, there is no relationship between the chief
expecting the future to be less than rosy and our indicator of grassroots political mobilization. Finally, there
is no relationship between the chief identifying priorities that are PNIR-compatible, and the likelihood of a
CCG emerging. The mechanism through which our village chief IVs aﬀect the probability of a project being
completed therefore does not appear to be based on political mobilization induced by the CDD process.27
On the other hand, the identiﬁcation being provided by the excluded IVs may stem from elite capture eﬀects,
though it is diﬃcult to see how to test for them explicitly.
4.2 CRs that are eventually treated
We now turn to the eﬀect on household and child welfare of completed projects for the subsample of house-
holds that belong to CRs that ultimately become eligible for treatment by the PNIR (a total of 22 CRs).
Though this reduces the size of the counterfactual sample (control CRs are not included), the PNIR program
resulted in the strengthening of a number of institutions that are potentially important in determining deliv-
ery of a completed project, yielding additional instruments with which to identify the impact of treatment on
the treated. In particular, detailed data pertaining to the makeup of the Conseil rural a r ea v a i l a b l ef o rt h e s e
CRs. Note that the identiﬁcation of the impact of completed projects on household expenditures or child
health in this context is still achieved both through time-series and cross-section variation in the pattern of
completed projects, within the 22 CRs that eventually become eligible for PNIR treatment, although most
of the identiﬁcation comes from the 19 CRs that become eligible at t =1 .
4.2.1 Identiﬁcation strategy
In addition to the village chief instruments considered in section 4.1, our identiﬁcation strategy in this section
i sb a s e do nt h ep o l i t i c so ft h eConseil rural, and the leverage that each village enjoys within this institution.
27It would seem unwise to use the CCG dummy as an additional excluded IV in the completed project reduced forms
because the emergence of a CCG and taking delivery of a completed project are likely to be jointly aﬀected by time-varying








































1Constructing additional instruments that will vary between villages in a given CR is particularly important
for the sample of CRs that are eventually treated by t =4because it is likely that most of the identiﬁcation
furnished by the village chief IVs stems from diﬀerences between these 22 CRs and the control CRs that
never become eligible.
Our key IV is given by a measure of the stock of political capital that a particular village may enjoy
within the Conseil rural of the CR to which it belongs. The intuition is as follows: the Conseil rural in
a CR is one of the main institutional actors that determines whether PNIR projects proposed by various
villages within the CR obtain PNIR funding, and it is the Conseil rural that must arbitrate between the
competing claims of several villages. The Conseil rural is constituted by individuals who originate from
diﬀerent villages within the CR.28 Consider three villages within the same CR: there are no individuals from
village A who are members of the corresponding Conseil rural; there is one individual from village B who
has been a member of the Conseil rural for 24 months, whereas village C has 5 individuals who between
them account for a total of 120 months of tenure within the Conseil rural. Then the stock of political capital
within the Conseil rural of village A is equal to 0, while the corresponding ﬁgures for villages B and C are
24 and 120, respectively. Our hypothesis is that the probability of a village obtaining a project, when it is
eligible (i.e. when the village is within a CR that is treated by the PNIR), is an increasing function of its
stock of political capital within the Conseil rural.29
Given the vibrant nature of party politics in Senegal at the sub-regional level, two additional instruments
can be constructed on the basis of this same intuition, by taking into account the party aﬃliation of a village’s
stock of political councillors within the Conseil rural. First, we consider whether at least one of the village’s
councilors has a party aﬃliation that corresponds to the party which controls the greatest number of seats
on the Conseil rural (the party in question may therefore not possess an absolute majority). On the one
hand, it is possible that belonging to the political party that controls the largest block of votes within the
Conseil rural may increase the political leverage of the village’s councilors. On the other hand, standard
political economy arguments suggest that one might uncover a "dictatorship of the minority" eﬀect, in which
belonging to a minority group increases one’s power through one’s ability to block proposals. Note that
there are a total of 16 diﬀerent political parties represented in the Conseil ruraux in our dataset, though 2
–the ruling Liberal party of President Wade, and the Socialist party of former President Diouf– are by far
the most important. Second, we consider the same variable, but deﬁned in terms of the absolute majority
on the Conseil rural, when such a majority exists.30
For all of these politically-motivated instrumental variables, the exclusion restrictions are that they do
not have any eﬀect on expenditures per capita or child health within the village, apart from the indirect
eﬀect that obtains through the probability that the village receives a PNIR project. Given that we control
for household- or child-speciﬁce ﬀects, these exclusion restrictions are robust to time-invariant unobservables
that would aﬀect both the political instruments and household income or child health. For our exclusion
28See Sénégal (1998) for the institutional details.
29The "tenure of political councilors" component of our identiﬁc a t i o ns t r a t e g yi sr e m i n i s c e n to ft h a tu s e db yL e v i t t( 1 9 9 7 )
to identify the impact of police hiring on violent crime in the US.
30An alternative manner of using the information concerning the makeup of the conseils ruraux is to compute an index of
the political power of each village, the most commonly used indices being those developed by Shapley and Shubik (1954) and
Banzhaf (1965). Based on the concept of the value of an n-person cooperative weighted voting game, power indices, which
are sometimes referred to as semivalues (Dubey, Neyman, and Weber (1981)), measure each village’s ap r i o r ipossibilities of
inﬂuencing the outcome of a vote in the conseil rural. The Shapley-Shubik index, for example, represents the expected number
of times a given player (village) will be in a pivotal position, where being pivotal means that one’s defection from a winning
coalition would turn it into a losing one, and assumes that all permutations (i.e. vote sequences) are equally probable. The
Banzhaf index, on the other hand, assumes that all coalitions are equiprobable. We are currently experimenting with diﬀerent








































1restrictions on these IVs to be invalid, one would therefore need time-varying shocks to aﬀect both the
probability of obtaining a project at the village level and the political makeup of the Conseil rural at the
CR level. Though possible, such a conﬁg u r a t i o ns t r i k e su sa sb e i n gh i g h l yu n l i k e l y . 31
4.2.2 Results
Results are presented in Table 14, with none of speciﬁcations being rejected by the tests of the overidentifying
restrictions, when we use the full set of seven IVs in the child anthropometrics results, and add the political
capital IVs to the PNIR eligibility and village chief priority IVs for the household expenditures equations. As
with the intent to treat results and the impact of completed PNIR projects using the full sample, there is no
IV evidence for a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of PNIR projects on household expenditures per capita. For
WAZ, on the other hand, the point estimate of the impact of completed projects using child-speciﬁce ﬀects
is almost 50% lower than the corresponding eﬀect using the full sample (it remains statistically signiﬁcant
at the usual levels of conﬁdence), which should come as no surprise given that the counterfactual does not
include children living in control CRs. For HAZ, on the other hand, the average eﬀect is not statistically
signiﬁcant, though again it is signiﬁcantly smaller in magnitude than the point estimate obtained using the
full sample.
When we consider the balanced sample and focus on children living in households that were poor in our
baseline survey, the estimated impact of completed PNIR projects is large and statistically signiﬁcant for
WAZ (as well as being slightly smaller in magnitude than the point estimate obtained using the full sample),
and the same is true for HAZ. The one noticeable diﬀerence between the results presented in Tables 12 and
14 is that there is a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of completed projects on the WHZ of children living in
poor households in Table 14, caused by the slightly larger reduction in the point estimate of the impact of
HAZ with respect to the results presented in Table 12 (since weight is in the numerator and height is in the
denominator for wasting, this should come as no surprise).
The reduced form equations corresponding to these estimates are presented in Table 15, and highlight
the importance of our politically-based IVs in terms of identifying the impact of completed PNIR projects.
In particular, once the village political capital instruments are entered in the reduced forms, the village chief
IVs lose a portion of their explanatory power, though the village chief expecting economic conditions to
deteriorate in the future signiﬁcantly reduces the probability of taking delivery of a completed project in
the child anthropometrics reduced forms with child-speciﬁce ﬀects (columns 5 or 6), and the village chief
expecting villagers to contribute solely labor still signiﬁcantly increases this probability.
The village political capital instruments exhibit a great deal of variability within the 22 CR sample, and
are highly signiﬁcant determinants of the probability of a village obtaining a PNIR project. First, the
probability of a village receiving a project is signiﬁcantly increasing in the stock of political capital that the
village enjoys on the Conseil rural, as measured by the total number of months of tenure of its councilors:
each additional councilor who serves for 1 year increases the probability of obtaining a project by roughly
31We also considered the existence of a CCG in the village as an additional IV. Though estimates based on this additional
instrument signiﬁcantly reduced the standard errors associated with completed PNIR projects, we prefer not to base our
discussion on these results in that the underlying exclusion restriction that renders it valid is much more tentative than that
for the conseil rural based instruments. In particular, time varying shocks that aﬀect the probability of obtaining a project
and simultaneously aﬀect the probability of having a functional CCG would render our results invalid. On the other hand, if
the unobserved heterogeneity that aﬀects the existence of a CCG is time-invariant, then our results based on this additional
IV would be valid. Note that the tests of the overidentifying restrictions are not rejected when we include this additional
IV. Since this village-level political instruments does not appear to be correlated with the disturbance term of the structural









































12%. Second, having a villager who is part of the largest party on the Conseil rural decreases the probability
of obtaining a project, whereas the opposite is true when one has a villager who is a member of the majority
party. This indicates that being part of an absolute majority increases one’s political capital in terms
of obtaining a PNIR project, whereas there is evidence for a "dictatorship of the minority" when a party
enjoying a plurality is the reference group. Thus, while village-level politics undoubtedly matter –in terms
of the interaction between the village chief and the population– when one considers a sample that includes
control CRs, and continue to inﬂuence the allocation of projects in the sample considered here, it is the
inﬂuence that the village enjoys at the Conseil rural level that is the main determinant, among villages that
eventually become eligible for treatment by the PNIR, who receives PNIR projects and who does not.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper, we have studied the impact of a major CDD project in Senegal on the welfare of the beneﬁ-
ciaries, using both household expenditures and child anthropometrics as response variables. The evidence
we have marshalled broadly suggests, at least as far as the PNIR is concerned, that CDD infrastructure pro-
grams do not increase beneﬁciary welfare in terms of expenditures by capita, but that they do improve the
nutritional status of children in treated households. Given that we have shown that the PNIR has improved
access to clean water and healthcare facilities, and that it is this improved access that in all likelihood lies
behind the improved child anthropometrics, and given that the PNIR was not designed in the short-term to
improve income-generating activities, it seems reasonable to conclude that the program has been a success.
In particular, the PNIR appears to have been particularly successful in improving the nutritional status of
children in poor households.
While the ﬁndings in terms of the impact of the PNIR on beneﬁciaries are important in terms of assessing
the eﬀectiveness of CDD programs of its type, the identiﬁcation strategy we adopted in order to pinpoint
the eﬀects of completed projects highlighted the importance of local politics. On the one hand, the role
played by village chiefs, as well as their interaction with the population at large in the context of CDD,
warrants much more analysis. This is particularly important in that the village-level institutions that are
often created alongside CDD, and which are meant to harness the voice of hitherto excluded groups, are
not well understood, especially in formal quantitative terms. On the other hand, we have highlighted the
paramount role played by sub-regional politics (the Conseil rural, in the Senegalese case), and focused on
how the ability of individual villages to aﬀect decisionmaking processes at this level of government directly
inﬂuences their likelihood of obtaining a completed CDD project. Another way of putting this is that if
sub-regional government does not give adequate voice to the villages it is meant to represent, there may be
"village-capture" in terms of the allocation of projects, and this phenomenon may well be just as important
as the elite capture that is the focus of many critiques of the CDD process.
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Figure 1: Kernel density estimates of the distributions of log expenditures per capita for households residing
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Figure 2: Kernel density estimates of the distributions of height-for-age z−scores (stunting) for children


























































Control CRs PNIR-eligible CRs
Figure 3: Kernel density estimates of the distributions of weight-for-age z−scores for children belonging to
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Figure 4: Kernel density estimates of the distributions of weight-for-height z−scores (wasting) for children









































(PNIR-eligible) (control) Completed projects
t CRs CRs total water health school other
Jun. 2003 0 (baseline) 00 0 0 0 0 0
Jan. 2004 11 8 1 8 1 1 1 1 8 1
Jun. 2004 22 1 1 5 2 4 3 6 1 0 5
Jan. 2005 32 1 1 5 2 7 3 9 1 0 5
Jun. 2005 42 1 1 5 3 0 4 9 1 2 5
Table 1: The timing of treatment and completed projects (cumulative), by project type, June 2003 to June
2005.
Mean
(standard deviation) H0 : no H0 : equality
Treated Non-treated diﬀerence of distributions
(PNIR-eligible) (control) in means Bartlett Kolmogorov
Response variables CRs CRs [p−value] [p−value] [p−value]








































Table 2: Baseline survey, t = 0. Testing the null that the distributions of the response variables are identical
between households/children in CRs that will eventually (over the four subsequent rounds of surveys) be
treated and control group CRs. Tests of the equality of means, Bartlett and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of









































Mean Min Max Total Within
village household child
Child characteristics
Height-for-age z−score −1.25 −4.99 3.00 1.54 1.47 1.16 0.80
male −1.28 −4.99 3.00 1.62 1.51 1.10 0.81
female −1.21 −4.90 2.94 1.45 1.35 1.02 0.79
0-12 months −0.77 −4.96 2.98 1.52 1.41 1.01 0.73
12-24 months −1.53 −4.99 3.00 1.60 1.46 0.91 0.49
24-36 months −1.38 −4.88 2.60 1.39 1.25 0.75 0.37
Weight-for-age z−score −0.99 −4.68 4.54 1.34 1.27 0.99 0.66
male −1.06 −4.40 4.54 1.38 1.28 0.91 0.65
female −0.92 −4.68 4.15 1.29 1.19 0.83 0.67
0-12 months −0.32 −4.00 4.54 1.42 1.31 0.91 0.68
12-24 months −1.25 −4.27 2.93 1.21 1.11 0.70 0.32
24-36 months −1.34 −4.68 1.76 1.17 1.04 0.62 0.31
Weight-for-height z−score −0.23 −3.96 4.79 1.31 1.24 0.99 0.69
male −0.33 −3.96 4.13 1.26 1.15 0.82 0.64
female −0.13 −3.81 4.79 1.34 1.24 0.93 0.74
0-12 months 0.32 −3.96 4.79 1.43 1.29 0.79 0.49
12-24 months −0.43 −3.90 3.70 1.27 1.17 0.72 0.45
24-36 months −0.55 −3.65 3.79 1.03 0.92 0.56 0.32
Age (months) 18.47 0.13 6 .99 10.07 9.87 8.49 5.39
Female 0.491 0 1 0.500 0.479 0.327 0
Household characteristics
Expenditures per capita 13,614 142 152,500 13,101 12,644 10,075
Age of head 53 17 92 14.11 3 .02 .4
Household size 10.71 3 4 4 .94 .41 .1
Head literate 0.359 0 1 0.480 0.451 0.265
Female head 0.130 0 1 0.336 0.313 0.075
Ethnic group of head:
Wolof 0.478 0 1 0.499 0.334 0.021
Pular 0.286 0 1 0.452 0.311 0.020
Serer 0.161 0 1 0.367 0.226 0.014
Diola 0.022 0 1 0.147 0.059 0.000
Other 0.017 0 1 0.132 0.121 0.015
Village characteristics
Population of village 1,331 135 10,046 1,538 273
Electricity in village 0.252 0 1 0.434 0.137
Literacy program in village 0.527 0 1 0.499 0.371
Table 3: Summary statistics on the full sample: 5 time periods, 36 CRs, 71 villages, 756 households (3,446










































per capita (FCFA) Height-for-age Weight-for-age Weight-for-height









































































p−value of diﬀerence 0.050 0.005 0.090 0.907
Table 4: Mean (standard error) of household expenditures per capita and child anthropometrics, by period,









































Dep. var. expenditures z−scores
per capita Weight-for-age Height-for-age Weight-for-height
Estimator Household Household Child Household Child Household Child
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE






















































































Time periods 5 5 5 5
C R s 3 6 3 63 63 6
V i l l a g e s 7 1 7 17 17 1
Households 756 496 496 496





































































Time periods 5 5 5 5
C R s 3 6 3 63 63 6
V i l l a g e s 7 1 7 17 17 1
Households 562 383 383 383
Children 798 798 798
Table 5: The impact of PNIR eligibility on log household expenditures per capita and child anthropometrics
(z-scores). Initial expenditure classes deﬁned on the basis of our baseline survey (standard errors clustered
at the rural community level in parentheses).
Dep. var. Access to basic infrastructure
Water Health School Road









Table 6: The impact of PNIR eligibility on the access to basic services (1 if access in village, 0 otherwise). 5
time periods, 38 CRs, 71 villages and 341 observations, of which 193 are treated (standard errors clustered









































Dep. var. expenditures z−scores
per capita Weight-for-age Height-for-age Weight-for-height
Estimator Household Household Household Household
FE FE FE FE










































































Time periods 2 2 2 2
CRs 36 36 36 36
Villages 71 71 71 71
Households 700 450 450 450
Table 7: Testing the parallel trends assumption. Simple DD estimates of impact of PNIR eligibility on log
household expenditures per capita and child anthropometrics (z-scores). Initial period is ESAM2 (2001),
ﬁnal period is our initial survey (June 2003). Initial expenditure classes deﬁned on the basis of ESAM2









































Dep. var. expenditures z−scores
per capita Weight-for-age Height-for-age Weight-for-height
Estimator Household Household Child Household Child Household Child
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)




























































































Households 562 294 294 294
Children 450 450 450




























































































T i m e p e r i o d s 2 222
C R s 3 6 3 63 63 6
V i l l a g e s 7 1 7 07 07 0
Households 562 302 302 302
Children 476 476 476
Table 8: Discarding the time-series dimension. The impact of PNIR eligibility on log household expenditures
per capita and child anthropometrics (z-scores). Initial expenditure classes deﬁned on the basis of our baseline










































Dep. var. expenditures z−scores
per capita Weight-for-age Height-for-age Weight-for-height
Estimator Household Household Child Household Child Household Child
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)




























































































Households 562 322 322 322
Children 544 544 544




























































































T i m e p e r i o d s 2 222
C R s 3 6 3 63 63 6
V i l l a g e s 7 1 6 96 96 9
Households 562 345 345 345
Children 635 635 635
Table 9: Discarding the time-series dimension. The impact of PNIR eligibility on log household expenditures
per capita and child anthropometrics (z-scores). Initial expenditure classes deﬁned on the basis of our baseline









































1Full Control 22 CRs that








Village is PNIR-eligible 0.565 0.775
(0.49) (0.41)
Village chief
Identiﬁes a village priority 0.739 0.782 0.722
that is PNIR eligible (0.43) (0.41) (0.44)
Expects villagers will be 0.516 0.586 0.489
willing to contribute labor (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Expects economic situation 0.041 0.010 0.052
to get worse over next 5 years (0.19) (0.10) (0.22)
Village political capital
Village’s stock of political capital 46.89
on the Conseil rural (in months) (84.9)
Villager is a member of the biggest 0.514
party on the Conseil rural (0.50)
Villager is a member of the majority 0.393
party on the Conseil rural (0.48)
Observations 341 92 249
Time periods 5 5 5
Villages 71 19 52








































1Village chief Village chief believes Political
identiﬁes the villagers economic mobilization:
village priority will situation a functional CCG
as being contribute has improved exists in the village
water health school road only labor in the past
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)









Village chief believes village is very poor 0.038
(0.08)
Villagers believe economic situation has improved in the past 0.401
(0.13)
Village chief excluded IVs
Village chief:












Village political capital excluded IVs
Village’s stock of political capital on Conseil rural (in months) −0.00015
(0.0006)
Villager is a member of the biggest party on the Conseil rural 0.462
(0.16)
Villager is a member of the majority party on the Conseil rural −0.059
(0.11)
Observations 341 341 341 341 341 341 341 249
Time periods 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Villages 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 52
CRs 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 22
Table 11: Heuristic tests of the validity of the village chief IVs, and of the link between village chief opinions
and political capital variables and political mobilization. Period dummies, village covariates and village-









































Dep. var. expenditures z−scores
per capita Weight-for-age Height-for-age Weight-for-height
Estimator Household Household Child Household Child Household Child
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full sample






















































Time periods 5 5 5 5
C R s 3 6 3 63 63 6
V i l l a g e s7 1 7 17 17 1
Households 754 493 493 493
Children 974 974 974
Balanced sample

































































































Time periods 5 5 5 5
C R s 3 6 3 63 63 6
V i l l a g e s7 1 7 07 07 0
Households 562 382 382 382
Children 785 785 785
Table 12: Instrumental variables estimates of the impact of completed PNIR projects on log household
expenditures per capita and child anthropometrics (z-scores). Initial expenditure classes deﬁn e do nt h eb a s i s









































1Dependent variable: PNIR project completed in village
Observation Household Child Child
Estimator Household FE Household FE Child FE
Sample Full Balanced Full Balanced Full Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Village chief excluded IVs
Village chief:













































Partial F 103.17 76.58 56.67 48.41 35.03 30.00















Time periods 5 5 5 5 5 5
C R s 3 6 3 6 3 63 6 3 63 6
V i l l a g e s 7 1 7 1 7 07 0 7 07 0
Households 754 562 493 382 493 382
Children 974 785 974 785
Table 13: The determinants of completed PNIR projects: reduced form equations (standard errors clustered









































Dep. var. expenditures z−scores
per capita Weight-for-age Height-for-age Weight-for-height
Estimator Household Household Child Household Child Household Child
FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full sample






















































Time periods 5 5 5 5
CRs 22 22 22 22
Villages 52 51 51 51
Households 550 342 342 342
Children 660 660 660
Balanced sample

































































































Time periods 5 5 5 5
CRs 22 22 22 22
Villages 52 51 51 51
Households 403 262 262 262
Children 523 523 523
Table 14: The 22 CRs that become PNIR-eligible by t = 4. Instrumental variables estimates of the impact
of completed PNIR projects on log household expenditures per capita and child anthropometrics (z-scores).
Initial expenditure classes deﬁned on the basis of our baseline survey (standard errors in parentheses).








































1Dependent variable: PNIR project completed in village
Observation Household Child Child
Estimator Household FE Household FE Child FE
Sample Full Balanced Full Balanced Full Balanced
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Village chief excluded IVs
Village chief:












































Village political capital excluded IVs








































Partial F 28.49 26.27 17.20 15.76 11.44 10.06















T i m e p e r i o d s 5 55 55 5
C R s 2 22 2 2 22 2 2 22 2
Villages 52 52 51 51 51 51
Households 550 403 342 262 342 262
Children 660 523 660 523
Table 15: The 22 CRs that become PNIR-eligible by t = 4. Determinants of completed PNIR projects:
reduced form equations (standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses). Village-, household-
and child-speciﬁc covariates included, as applicable.
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